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ABS TRACT
International capital mobility has typically been ignored in
discussions of the welfare effects of the capital income tax. In the atypical
analysis which does consider the open economy it is recognized that highly-.
elastic capital flows could significantly alter the usual conclusions.
While there have been strenuous debates about the elasticity of
international capital flows, there can be little disagreement that inter-
national ownership of capital is an important and growing phenomenon. In this
paper, we explore the welfare effects of changes in the capital income tax from
a different perspective: that of a country in which foreign ownership of a por-
tion of the capital stock and foreign owners'payment of taxesis a reality.
With this modification in emphasis, a simple graphical analysis is
sufficient to indicate that international capital ownership could easily domi-
nate other welfare effects of tax changes. At least, the arguments presented
in this paper raise a caution about ignoring the openness of the economy simply
because elasticities are believed small.
David G. Hartman
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In analyzing the impacts of capital income taxation, researchers have
typically ignored the possibility of international capital movements. One
major exception is the work of Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley (1983), in which
U.S. investment abroad is explicitly incorporated in a large general
equilibrium model. Goulder, et al. demonstrate that the welfare effects of a
variety of possible tax changes can be strongly influenced b,r the presence of
highly—elastic capital outflows. The few other discussions of capital taxation
in an open economy take the same general approach: international capital mobi-
lity is viewed as merely a potential constraint on domestic policymaking. The
constraint is seen as important only if the degree of capital mobility assumed
in the analysis is relatively (some would say unrealistically) high.l
The elasticity of international capital flows has thus been taken as
the determinant of whether ourusualanalysis of capital taxation must he
altered in recognition of the openness of the U.S. economy.2 As a consequence,
public finance researchers have taken some comfort from the (admittedly contro-
versial) findings of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Feldstèin (1983) that
capital apparently does not move readily across national boundaries. Providing
further ammunition for those who prefer the traditional closed—economy analysis
is the literature on multinational firms which generally concludes that taxes
play at most a minor role in international investment decisions.3
*Vjce President and Chief International Economist, DEl and Research Affiliate
and former Executive Director, 1BER.—2—
Since the U.S. econorrr appears destined for increased inter-
nationalization, and international capital inflows are at an unprecedented
level, the effort to understand capital mobility and its implications for
policy will almost certainly intensify. Rather than enter the debate on the
extent of capital mobility, we seek here to confront directly the important
issue of the welfare effects of capital income taxation when the capital stock
to which the tax applies is partly foreign owned. Since the extent of foreign
ownership is well—documented we will take that phenomenon as given and consider
the implications of different degrees of capital mobility. Surprising in light
of the conventional wisdom is our conclusion that international capital
ownership could plausibly have implications for economic welfare that dwarf
other considerations related to capital taxation, even if the perceived ine-
lasticity of international capital flows turns out to be an accurate charac-
terization. Specifically, a simple calculation demonstrates that even if
capital is totally unresponsive to rates of return, the mere presence of a
stock of foreign—owned capital is sufficient to reverse the direction of
welfare effects arising from relatively major tax changes widely perceived as
having important welfare consequences.
I. Welfare Effects of the Capital Income Tax
A. It happens to be most convenient for our purposes if we focus on the
welfare implications of the presence of a foreign—owned capital supply, taking
the domestic distortions caused by taxes on capital income as given. In other
words, we willbefocusing on the welfare effects that would be left out of a—3—
closed—economy analysis. To demonstrate the basic approach, Figure 1 illustra-
tes a closed economy capital market equilibrium consisting of a capital stock
of S =K,earning a rate of return rc. Since our focus is on the grafting of a
foreign sector onto the traditional model, little attention will be given to
the specific assumptions and behavioral relations underlying the supply of
savings, 3(r), and demand for capital, K(r) schedules. An economy in which
foreign investors supply K'—S' of capital when the world and open domestic eco-
nomy rates of return are r0, finds domestic savers supplying S' and domestic
investment totaling K'.
Comparing the open economy equilibrium to that of the closed economy,
we determine that the foreign capital made available to the domestic economy
leads to extra domestic production, which can be measured as the area ACK'K.
Using some rather loose but quite common terminolor (as we will discuss in
more detail below), we will describe AKS'B as the "value of the domestic
savings" (s—s') made available for other uses by the foreign capital inflow.
Foreign investors are paid only BCK'S' for the use of their capital, so the
domestic economy is better off by an amount measured by ABC as a consequence of
foreign investment.
Those who are familiar with the literature on the welfare effects of
capital income taxation (especially Feldstein (1918) and the work which has
built on its important insights) will recognize the difficulty in measuring
welfare effects by the area under the savings supply function. To analyze
welfare effects of distortions to savings, it is important to recognize that










focus is that which alters the level of future consumption. After all, future
consumption is the "good" for which demand is being distorted by the tax.
There are several reasons for not paying a great deal of attention to this
complication in the present context. First, and not of minor importance, is
that the analysis is simplified considerably and clarified enormously by the
use of graphs, as is common in discussions of open economies. It is not
obvious how graphical analysis of international capital movements could be
integrated with explicit consiaeration of the impact on iuture consumption.
Furthermore, it does notseemnecessary. Recall that we are not interested in
the welfare effects of changes in the tax rate on capital income, but only on
the portion of the welfare effects of tax changes arising because of the inter-
national ownership and mobility of capital. It is only under "special assump-
tions" that we will arrive at highly specific conclusions anyway and in those
cases the results turn out not to be sensitive to our shorthand method of
describing welfare changes in terms of the "savings elasticity." In any event,
the implications for future consumption are generally ciuite clear; those
instances in which conclusions drawn from a focus on the savings elasticity
could be misleading will be highlighted. Otherwise, we will simply proceed as
if the graphs were illustrating the curves with the conceptually—correct
elasticities.
Suppose that, in addition to not being able to extract the total pro-
duction we would attribute to the presence of their capital in the domestic
economy, foreign investors are required to pay taxes to the host country's
government on their returns. Then, the welfare differential is given by the—6—
areaABC plus the tax revenue extracted from the foreigners' returns.
B. The Full Market Model
The extension of this analysis to incorporate the full workings of
the market in the presence of taxes requires the complications included in
Figure 2. The left—hand panel in Figure 2 begins with Figure 1 and adds sche-
dules indicating the relationships of capital supply to gross rates of return
when capital returns are taxed at an initial rate t, as well as a reduced rate
t'. Obviously, the S(r(l—t)) schedule is simply the S(r) schedule displaced
upward by rt in order that the given net rate of return produces the same level
of saving under different tax schemes. The right—hand portion of the figure
shows the net demand schedules for capital imports, D ,derivedfrom the rela—
n
tionships shown in the left—hand panel at the initial tax rate and at the
reduced tax rate. The net foreign capital supply schedules, S*(),
corresponding to different tax rates are drawn with moderate upward slope in
Figure 2, but since their shape is obviously controversial, a range of alter-
natives will be examined.
Equilibrium obtains under the original tax regime with S (=K—S)of
foreign capital supplied and capital earning gross return rG. The presence of
foreign investment provides an increment to national welfare of the area ABC
(which, by construction, can be measured in either panel), plus the revenue
collected from foreign investors BCJI. At the reduced tax rate t', the
corresponding welfare effect is given by the sum of areas DEF and EFHG) An














































































































byan amount (DEF —ABC)+ (EFHG -BCJI).It should again by emphasized that
we are describing only the extra welfare effect arising from the economy's
openness to foreign investment, not the total welfare effect of the tax.In
other words, we are examining "how incorrect" the closed economy analysis would
be.
Because of the particular way in which Figure 2 has been drawn, the
tax's extra welfare effect due to the foreign investor is clearly negative,
arising largely because the tax cut radically reduces the tax revenue obtained
from foreign owners of the capital stock. The revenue impact is our crucial
point of departure from the conventional model of the welfare effects of the
corporate income tax: unlike a redistribution between parties within the
system, which need not be considered in a context of total welfare, a tax cut
on the foreign investor's return redistributes income toward those outside the
system and is accompanied by a potentially large welfare ioss. Some notion of
the possible order to magnitude of this factor will be obtained below; but,
first,some special cases will beexamined to shed further light on the
workingsof the model.
C."Small"Foreign Investment
Asanextreme case, suppose that foreign investment is "small" rela-
tive to the size of the total domestic capital market. In the context of our
model,this situation is defined asone in which the level of foreign invest-
ment has a negligible impact on the domestic rate of return. The net domestic









the domestic capital market conditions alone dictate the extent to which the
net rate of return paid to foreign investors increases in response to a tax
cut.
More importantly, the welfare implications of adding the foreign sec-
tor to the standard model can be described by examining only the change in tax
revenue received from foreign investors (EFHG —BCJI).5The incremental
welfare effect could obviously be positive or negative depending on the elasti-
city of the international capital supply. Surprisingly, the case of a coraple—
tely inelastic supply, which has been dismissed as uninteresting in prior
studies, produces the highest net welfare loss, with the error produced by
ignoring foreign investment being equal to the change in the tax rate times the
level of the foreign capital invested. Of course, the effect may not be of
great significance if foreign investment is literally "small" in the sense of
having negligible effects on capital returns. However, what the example shows
is that there could be implications worthy of analysis even (or especially) in
cases in which capital flows are perfectly inelastic.
D. Perfectly Inelastic Capital Flows
We therefore turn to the more general situation of a non—negligible
level of foreign capital which is perfectly inelastic in supply. This case is
of obvious interest, since it is the extreme version of the situation cited to
justify the use of closed economy models of capital income taxation.
As Figure )4demonstrates,and as the reader has undoubtedly inferred














































erroneous. A fixed foreign capital supply, SLS', produces a fixed differen-
tial, K—S =K'—S',between domestic supply and demand, as the tax changes shift
the supply schedule. First, it is important to recognize that the welfare
impact of a tax cut in this special case is influenced by the presence of
foreign capital in a manner not fundamentally different from the general
situation shown in Figure 2. Specifically, it consists of both a "surplus"
term (DEF —ABC)and a "revenue" term (EFGH —BCJI).That is, contrary to the
intuition of most researchers, the nature of the domestic demand and supply
relations determine the extent of additional welfare effect, even in this
limiting case of a completely inelastic supply of capital from abroad.
The revenue term is naturally very simple when S* is completely ine-
lastic, equaling the decline in the tax rate times the previous total return to
foreign capital. The surplus term, however, cannot be signed without further
investigation.6
Take, for example, the case of domestic capital being perfectly
elastic in demand. The level of domestic savings (and future consumption) is
unaffected by the presence of foreign capital.7 As a consequence, there is no
extra welfare effect except that measured by the decline in tax revenue
collected from foreign investors.
On the other hand, if the domestic demand is completely inelastic,
the level of domestic savings is unaffected by the tax, as is the net return to
savers, regardless of the presence or absence of foreign investment. So, not
only is the level of future consumption unaltered by the tax change, as is well
known from the previous literature, but also it is unaffected by the presence—13—
of foreign investment. Again, therefore, the only welfare implications of
foreign investment arise from changes in tax revenue.
For intermediate cases, a variety of results could conceivably be
obtained, but it seems plausible that any "extra't welfare terms will be relati-
vely minor, as we will describe below.
To carry this exercise only one step further, we will make no extreme
demand assumption but note that the argument is often made for a completely
inelastic domestic savings schedule. Under such circumstances, domestic
savings is, of course, unaffected by the tax. Thus, future consumption is
reduced by the capital tax, which means that the tax is distortionary.
However, the percentage reduction in future consumption being unrelated to the
presence of foreign investment implies that, once again, the "extra surplus
term" is zero. Hence, the welfare change attributable to the economy's open-
ness is simply the tax revenue change. The same conclusion holds for the case
of perfectly elastic domestic savings, this time because the level of future
consumption is unaffected by the tax, regardless of the presence of foreign
investment.
For intermediate cases, the results could vary qualitatively
depending upon the exact nature of the behavioral relations, but it seems
plausible that any welfare effects attributable to foreign investment (other
than the loss in tax revenue) will be relatively minor. From the standpoint of
economic welfare, the presence of a fixed level of foreign investment is iden-
tical to a leftward parallel shift in the domestic capital demand schedule.
Such a shift will, in general, affect thewelfarecalculation, as one can-l4-
intuitively see from Figure .Thereason, clearly, is that the elasticities
of the domestic supply and demand schedules could be different in the presence
of foreign capital than those in its absence. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
imagine in "normal" circumstances the effect being sufficiently large to divert
major attention away from the tax: revenue effect. In fact, the usual
discussion of welfare effects of the capital income tax would rely on obser-
vation of a market equilibrium in the presence of foreign investment and would
already be capturing the "extra surplus term."
In conclusion, we have considered the case of perfectly inelastic
international capital flows under a variety of (extreme) domestic circumstan-
ces. This case is the one widely believed to leave intact our closed economy
welfare calculations. In each instance, the net welfare gain to the economy
from lowering the tax on capital income wasshownto be overestimated
exactly- the fall in tax revenue collected from foreign investors when that
foreign ownership is ignored. In a later section, an argument will be made for
this effect being large, but first the case of perfectly elastic international
capital flows will be considered, to indicate the manner in which alternative
assumptions change our story.
E. Perfectly Elastic Capital Flows
Consider, then, the other extreme of international capital flows
being perfectly elastic, as many international economists would argue is the
most realistic assumption. A proportional tax cut can do nothing but reduce
the gross rate of return to capital to exactly offset the tax change. Domestic—15—
savings, thus, remain constant, while the capital stock and the capital
supplied from abroad increase by an amount determined by the elasticity of the
domestic investment demand schedule. The constancy of the after—tax rate of
return implies that future domestic consumption is, likewise, undistorted. As
Figure 5 and this verbal argument indicate, the presence of perfectly elastic
flows of foreign investment implies that the welfare gains to savers from
lowering the tax, which would have been predicted from a closed econor model,
are not realized. At the same time, lowering the tax induces a higher level of
foreign investment and foreign investors are paid less than the total product
of the additional capital, even ignoring, for the moment, the tax burden borne
by the foreign investor. This extra gain tends to offset the mistake a closed—
economy model would make on the savings side. Since the part of the actual
welfare effect of the tax change which is attributable to the phenomenon of
foreign investment is measured by netting two welfare terms, each depending on
elasticities of demand and supply schedules at different points, it is not
surprising that it depends on the particular parameters of behavioral rela-
tionships. That is, the surplus term (11SF —ABC),or, more accurately, its
equivalent in terms of future consumption, is of indeterminate sign. Clearly,
as the domestic demand for capital elasticity declines, the surplus term must
at some point become negative. Similarly, as savings becomes less elastic, the
surplus term must turn positive at some point, since the "phantom" welfare gain
calculated by the closed economy model would have disappeared even in the
closed economy model. In summary, the non—revenue welfare effect due to












Furthermore, unlike the case of perfectly inelastic international
flows, the revenue change can also be either positive or negative, depending on
the elasticity of the net domestic demand for capital.
As a result of this examination of the perfectly elastic case, then,
we must conclude that one might need to know a great deal about the domestic
capital market in order to determine even the direction of the bias produced by
ignoring the openness of the economy.
F. General Conclusions
Some idea of the potential magnitude of some of these welfare effects
will be the subject of a concluding section, but, before addressing that
question, we review the general results. First, the size of the foreign
investment inflow is crucial. If it is small relative to the total of domestic
investment, its degree of influence on the welfare effect of a tax can be
measured by the tax revenue foregone by the domestic government. If the amount
of foreign capital supplied to the domestic economy is large, but the supply is
relatively inelastic, the welfare loss can probably still be approximated by
the revenue loss, which can be estimated as the tax reduction times the level
of foreign investment. However, from the standpoint of capturing all of the
welfare effects of a tax change, it is important to recognize that the presence
of even a perfectly inelastic supply of foreign capital has further implica-
tions for the welfare effects of tax changes, as we have shown.
While the revenue effect can be established conclusively as the major
component of the additional welfare loss only in one of several "special cir——18—
cumstances" we have examined, the situations normally described in the public
finance literature are ones in which the change in the foreign investors' tax
liability could well provide a reasonable first approximation.
At the same time, a highly elastic supply of foreign capital does
open a much wider range of possibilities including, of course, the "foreign tax
revenue effect" of a tax rate cut being positive. In general, the domestic and
foreign capital market conditions will determine whether the openness of the
econour is an important factor in welfare analysis. Of particular interest is
the result that an inelasticity of international capital flows is not suf-
ficient to determine the conclusion.—19—
II. Some Evidence of Magnitudes
After having detailed the complications introduced in a variety of
cases, let us return to where we began this paper: with the situation which
many would view as consistent with the "conventional wisdom." That is, suppose
that foreign investment is quite inelastic. Suppose, further that the net
domestic demand for capital, compared to foreign investment, is either relati—
vely elastic, because foreign investment is "small" or because of the nature of
the domestic capital market conditions themselves. Whether one needs to be
cautious about ignoring foreign investment when examining welfare effects of a
capital income tax change then depends, for all practical purposes, on whether
the tax rate change produces a change in the revenue derived from foreign
investors which is large relative to the other welfare effects being con-
sidered.
Table 1 shows estimates of the revenue collected from foreign direct
investors under the U.S. corporate income tax for several recent years.
Comparing these figures with recent estimates of the welfare cost of the cor-
porate income tax, should give pause to those who emphasize the welfare cost
numbers in calling for major reforms. For example, Fullerton, et al. (1983)
estimates the welfare cost of the corporation tax at 2.8 percent of revenue
under the 1980 law or about 2.)4 billion 1980 dollars. In 1980, corporate
income taxes raised over $7 billion from foreign investors, and through the
period for which data are available, revenues were growing rapidly as was the
level of foreign investment. Under our assumptions, the welfare effect of eli-
minating the corporate income tax in 1980 could have been, not a gain of $2.8—20—
Table 1
Taxes Paid and Income Received by Foreign Investors
U.S. Income Net Data
Year Tax* Income Source Notes
$2.339 b $2.182 b U.S. Commerce Department, Does not
Survey of Current Business, include
5/16 Middle East
1977 $3.290 b $2.876 b U.S. Commerce Department,
Survey of Current Business,
5/81
1918 $3.530 b $1.731b U.S. Commerce Department,
Survey of Current Business,
5/81
1979 $5.111 b 7.271 b U.S. Commerce Department,
Survey of Current Business,
5/81
1980 $7.066 b $8.917 b U.S. Commerce Department,
Foreign Direct Investment
in the United States, 1980,
10/83
*Includes state and local corporate income taxes.—21—
billion, but a loss of $1.6 billion. This calculation is, naturally, intended
to be only illustrative of how important the treatment of foreign investment
earnings could be in a welfare calculation. Our assumptions do not provide an
upper bound in any sense since we are simply neglecting a portion of the
welfare effect. On the other hand, higher estimates of the welfare cost of the
system have been made: Auerbach (1983), for example, obtains an estimate of
about $5 billion for 1981 for the cost of distortions produced by the rnisallo—
cation of the capital stock alone. Nevertheless, the treatment of foreign
investment under any reform designed to reduce the welfare cost of the system
could be an important determinant of the reform's overall welfare effect. From
the perspective of this paper, an important insight is that the importance of
foreign investment is not dependent on that investment being highly elastic.—22—
Footnotes
1. For a discussion of the degree of capital mobility implict in the GSW
analysis, see Hartman (1983).
2. See, for example, Boadway (1979), Shoven (198)4), and Kotlikoff (l98)-).
3. Vernon (1971).
)4. At this point, we drop the unnecessary "sum of the areas" DEF and EFGH
and refer simply to "DEF +EFGH."
5. Of course, since neither domestic savings nor the rate of return
received by savers is affected by the behavior of foreign investors, this is a
degenerate case with respect to the concerns about using the "savings elastici-
ty" rather than the "elasticity of future consumption" raised in Section I.E
above.
6. It is obviously important at this point to recall the caution of
Section I.E above that DEF and ABC are not actually the appropriate represen-
tations. However, since we cannot sign (DEF—ABC) anyway, we will discuss the
matter only in the context of special cases.
7. Obviously, the tax change will affect future consumption, with the
gross rate of return fixed. So, the analysis of the tax cut itself would pro-
vide an extreme example in which the distinction between a distortion to
savings and to future consumption is crucial. However, the presence of a fixed
level of foreign investment in the context of a perfectly elastic domestic
capital demand has no separate influence on either domestic savings or future
consumption.—23—
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